A bold ban with a dangerous caveat
On 22 June, the UK government unveiled a landmark policy prohibiting public-sector bodies—including NHS trusts, local authorities and schools—from paying ransomware demands. Heralded as a decisive blow against cybercriminals, the ban aims to undermine the financial incentives that fuel the explosive rise in ransomware attacks. Yet this measure, while significant, risks leaving frontline services perilously exposed if not accompanied by a massive uplift in cyber resilience.
The mechanics of the new rules
Under the new policy:
- All public-sector organisations are barred from making ransomware payments to any criminals.
- Private businesses need not face an outright ban, but must notify government authorities before paying demands to any groups designated under UK sanctions.
- The Home Office has pledged to issue clear guidance and legal advice, warning that paying certain actors could breach international sanctions regimes.
Security Minister Dan Jarvis emphasised the need for a zero-tolerance approach: “Ransomware is a predatory crime that puts the public at risk, wrecks livelihoods and threatens the services we depend on. That’s why we’re determined to smash the cybercriminal business model and protect the services we all rely on as we deliver our Plan for Change.”
Support versus reality
A government consultation revealed nearly 75 percent public-sector support for the ban—an impressive figure reflecting widespread frustration at the soaring cost of ransom payouts. But enthusiasm for policy changes must confront the practical realities on the ground. Experts warn that outlawing payments is only the first step: without robust defences, emergency recovery plans and offline data backups, organisations will be left to grapple with attacks they can neither afford to pay nor to endure.
Industry voices raise red flags
Cybersecurity leaders have been quick to point out the policy’s limitations:
- Spencer Starkey, Executive VP EMEA at SonicWall, cautions: “The government’s intent to ban ransomware payments is a bold but necessary step—one that signals to criminal groups that the UK will not be held hostage. But policy alone isn’t protection. Without investment in resilience—tested backups, staff training, monitoring systems—this ban risks pushing breaches underground rather than preventing them.”
- James Moss, Director of Cyber Investigations at Addleshaw Goddard, highlights the tension between individual survival and national interest: “Paying a ransom often feels like the only way to avoid further disruption. Given the reputational damage at stake, many organisations will pay quietly. There remains an asymmetry between what is best for any particular organisation and what is best for the economy as a whole.”
- Gareth Oldale of law firm TLT observes: “If discretion to pay ransoms is removed, Boards will need to rethink how they respond in these often-devastating scenarios. Investment in cyber hygiene and response plans must become non-negotiable boardroom priorities.”
Public sector case studies reveal the gaps
High-profile incidents underscore the dangers of underinvestment:
- British Library attack, 2023: This national institution refused to pay a six-figure ransom but lacked tested recovery procedures, resulting in weeks of service disruption.
- Monzo’s £21m FCA fine: While not a direct ransomware case, it highlighted how regulatory penalties can cripple fintechs with inadequate cyber controls—signalling similar risks for cash-strapped councils.
Without pre-emptive measures—offline backups, crisis simulations and threat intelligence sharing—even the best-intentioned organisations will struggle to recover swiftly or securely.
Building true resilience: a four-point plan
A truly effective anti-ransomware strategy must go beyond banning payments. Critical steps include:
- Comprehensive backup regimes: Offline, air-gapped copies of all mission-critical data, tested regularly to ensure reliable restoration.
- Incident response rehearsals: Cross-department exercises simulating a live ransomware breach, clarifying roles, decision pathways and communication protocols.
- Network segmentation and zero-trust architectures: Minimising lateral movement by attackers, isolating sensitive systems and enforcing strict access controls.
- Dedicated cyber funding: Ring-fenced budgets for ongoing vulnerability assessments, staff training and security platform upgrades, justified as essential public services.
The risk of symbolic regulation
Without these parallel investments, the ban risks becoming a purely symbolic gesture—however well-intentioned. Ransomware gangs will inevitably adapt, targeting private partners or supply chains until their demands are met through backdoors. Worse, beleaguered public bodies could see increased disruption if attackers resort to data destruction in retaliation against a non-payment stance.
A chance for systemic reform
Yet the ban also presents an opportunity: by removing the option to pay, the government can create powerful incentives for organisations to modernise their cyber defences. Mandatory reporting proposals—requiring advance notification of any contemplated ransom payment—could yield vital intelligence for law enforcement. Data from these reports, if analysed and shared effectively, could highlight emerging threats and attack patterns, improving collective defence.
A call to action
The UK’s ban on ransom payments to the public sector must be matched by concerted action on resilience. Council leaders, NHS boards and school governors must secure dedicated funding lines, embrace rigorous backup and recovery standards, and prioritise cyber readiness at the highest levels. Only then can the policy truly protect the services that millions of Britons rely on every day—beyond mere headlines, and into lasting security reform.
